Cycles of Genocide, Stories of Denial: Atom Egoyan\u27s Ararat by Frieze, Donna-Lee
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An
International Journal
Volume 3 | 2008 Issue 2 | Article 7
Cycles of Genocide, Stories of Denial: Atom
Egoyan's Ararat
Donna-Lee Frieze
Abstract.
This article focuses on Atom Egoyan’s Ararat and explores how, through a convoluted narrative
structure, Egoyan grapples with denial of the Armenian Genocide and the consequences of those
denials for present generations—both Turkish and Armenian—illuminated in the film as an
extension of the genocide. Egoyan uses a film-within-a-film to move beyond a popular definition of
genocide as mass killing alone and links the understanding of stories, truths, and perspectives in
everyday life to the dehumanizing acts of genocide. Employing the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’
ethical theory of the Other (the ethical) and philosophical understandings of ontology
(dehumanization) to illuminate the genocide and its ongoing denial, this article contends that
Egoyan’s focus on the generations of genocide survivors points to the ethical responsibility to one
another that underlies everyday lives and sits at the heart of what is absent in the acts of genocide.
Keywords.
Armenian Genocide, Emmanuel Levinas, Atom Egoyan, film
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and
Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frieze, Donna-Lee (2008) "Cycles of Genocide, Stories of Denial: Atom Egoyan's Ararat," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An
International Journal: Vol. 3: Iss. 2: Article 7.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol3/iss2/7
Cycles of Genocide, Stories of Denial:
Atom Egoyan’s Ararat
Donna-Lee Frieze
School of History, Heritage and Society, Deakin University,
Australia
This article focuses on Atom Egoyan’s Ararat and explores how, through a
convoluted narrative structure, Egoyan grapples with denial of the Armenian
Genocide and the consequences of those denials for present generations—both
Turkish and Armenian—illuminated in the film as an extension of the genocide.
Egoyan uses a film-within-a-film to move beyond a popular definition of genocide
as mass killing alone and links the understanding of stories, truths, and
perspectives in everyday life to the dehumanizing acts of genocide. Employing
the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’ ethical theory of the Other (the ethical) and
philosophical understandings of ontology (dehumanization) to illuminate the
genocide and its ongoing denial, this article contends that Egoyan’s focus on the
generations of genocide survivors points to the ethical responsibility to one another
that underlies everyday lives and sits at the heart of what is absent in the acts
of genocide.
Keywords: Armenian Genocide, Emmanuel Levinas, Atom Egoyan, film
Do you know what causes so much pain? It’s not the people we lost, or the land. It’s to
know we could be so hated. Who are these people who could hate us so much? How can
they still deny their hatred, and so hate us, hate us even more?1
Atom Egoyan’s Ararat focuses on the genocide of the Armenians by the Young Turks in
the early part of the twentieth century. The Ottoman Empire repeatedly persecuted
the Christian Armenian minority population prior to the outbreak of World War I, but
it was not until the disintegration of the empire, the increasing wave of nationalism,
and subsequent threats from Russia that the genocide of the Armenians began in
1915.2 Egoyan’s film can be regarded as a commentary on the polemics of representing
this traumatic history, which in some communities—in particular, present-day
Turkey—is misunderstood, denied, and often misrepresented as a civil war. This
article focuses on the difficulties of representing a genocide that is cloaked in denial
and, through a framework of Emmanuel Levinas’ theory of the ethical, on how the
repercussions of the events inform the narratives of Ararat.
Egoyan—a Canadian of Armenian descent—develops a film-within-a-film to
illustrate the issues surrounding the representation of the genocide. At its core, the
film is about the production and filming of an epic feature film on the Armenian
Genocide, directed by Edward Saroyan (Charles Aznavour) and also titled Ararat.
(For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the film-within-the-film as ‘‘Saroyan’s film’’; the
title Ararat will refer to Egoyan’s film.) Ararat is a self-conscious attempt to explain
the difficulties arising in art’s ability—and inability—to represent complexities
resulting from a denied genocide. The stories that arise from this genocide inform
the nucleus of Egoyan’s circuitous narratives.
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Ararat focuses on the way in which the characters reiterate and understand
stories: stories about themselves, others, and the Armenian Genocide. For some, the
Armenian Genocide is just a story, prompting one reviewer of the film to remark that
‘‘we are left emotionally chilled because Egoyan has chosen to tell a tale 87 years after
the event.’’3 However, a serious examination of the film highlights the irony in such a
comment: Ararat demonstrates that the history is not located only in the past and that
the idea of an event’s occupying an enclosed temporal sphere is nonsensical. Thus, the
stories people tell and how they listen and respond to the interlocutor are, for Egoyan,
connected to the understanding of the Armenian Genocide and its denial today.
The central diacritical question about the aftermath of the Armenian genocide
asks, What happens when subsequent generations deny the crime? While the Turkish
government today denies the occurrence of the genocide,4 Egoyan weaves repudiation
into the stories and lives of the characters. As there are no codes in place for the
Turkish people to remember these events as genocide, the strained relationships in
Ararat silence the diasporic communities as they struggle to articulate their own
testimony and their refusal of Others’ testimony.
The subject of denial corresponds to Levinas’ philosophy of the Other and his
difficulties with ontology, whereby I am too obsessed with my own Being to be
concerned with yours.5 For Levinas, the core of his philosophy of the ethical lies in the
concept of the ‘‘Other’’ who commands my highest respect. It is the concept of the
lower-case ‘‘other’’—at once alien, yet an extension of me and, thus, ontological—that
Levinas detects in Western philosophy. This ‘‘‘egoism’ of ontology’’6 links directly to the
concepts of genocide and denial portrayed in Egoyan’s film. Indeed, Ararat questions
an undercurrent of self-obsession whereby the ability to deny someone’s history
informs not only the genocide but also the characters’ interwoven lives. Closely
connected to the ethical responsibility to the Other, denial of the genocide links with
the Other’s right to be Other, because it refuses an ethical discourse in the encounter
with the Other. In addition, the Levinasian understanding of the ethical exposes the
devastating characteristics of genocide and of denial.
Interestingly, Egoyan comments that it is a ‘‘misleading thing to think that this is
a film [only] about the genocide,’’7 presumably because the film relegates the genocide
to individual memories and does not engage in a pictorial, historical analysis of mass
murder—but also because Egoyan is more interested in the aftermath of the genocide.8
Ararat generates bold statements on the values and difficulties of representation, and,
despite Egoyan’s remarks, is one of the few films about Raphael Lemkin’s formulated
term to mention the word ‘‘genocide.’’9 Thus, in an act of self-consciousness, Ararat
does not shy away from its purpose: to connect implicitly and explicitly with all the
violations arising out of article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG).10 As I demonstrate below, Ararat is preoccupied
with the consequences of living with the denial of an unfathomable event. In this
respect, the film is deeper than the perceived view of genocide as mass murder alone.
The intricate structure of the film impinges on the perception of genocide and the
way Egoyan perceives the legacy and consequences of the genocide on his characters.
Through Ararat’s convoluted narrative structure, Egoyan portrays the genocide beyond
a quantitative analysis of numbers killed, and thus effectively portrays what genocide
is and what differentiates it from other human-rights crimes. Article 2 of the CPPCG
identifies genocide as acts of gradations, specifying physical genocide (art. 2(a), 2(b),
2(c)), psychological genocide (art. 2(b)), biological genocide (art. 2(d), 2(e)) and implying
cultural genocide (art. 2(e)). Physical genocide involves the intent to induce bodily harm
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to the group or kill members of the group; according to the International Criminal
Court, it may consist of torture or rape,11 ‘‘deliberate deprivation of resources
indispensable for survival . . . or systematic expulsion from homes.’’12 The mental and
emotional harm inflicted on members of the group, including trauma from rape and
torture, constitutes psychological genocide and may include ‘‘inhuman or degrading
treatment’’13 and ‘‘detention [or] psychological oppression.’’14 The destruction of the
group resulting from sterilization and rape is identified as biological destruction, and
cultural genocide may be defined as the prospective loss of heritage and community. All
these aspects point to the dehumanization of the Other as a condition of genocide by
denigrating, destroying, or withholding the victims’ right to live as a group, and all
these features are portrayed in Ararat as genocidal.
As the statement by Saroyan that forms the epigraph to this article suggests,
Ararat captures the ongoing pain of the consequences of a denied genocide for
subsequent generations. Using Saroyan’s film to depict genocide as the intended
annihilation of a group allows Egoyan to deconstruct an understanding of genocide as
mass murder, exploring questions—often unanswered—about the devastating effects
of denial and the ethical proximity of the Other, depicted as a continuation of the
genocide, from one individual to the next.
Synopsis
Ararat’s complex narrative needs clarification. The film revolves around Raffi (David
Alpay), a young man of Armenian descent who is coming to terms with his history. His
mother, Ani (Arsine´e Khanjian), is an art historian who has written a book on the artist
Arshile Gorky (Gorky is the pseudonym for Vostanig Adoian, played in the film by Simon
Abkarian), a survivor of the Armenian Genocide. Raffi’s father, a ‘‘freedom fighter’’
(sometimes referred to as a ‘‘terrorist’’), was shot while trying to assassinate a Turkish
diplomat, while Ani’s second husband died in mysterious circumstances. Ani’s
stepdaughter, Celia (Marie-Jose´e Croze), who has a sexual relationship with Raffi,
heckles Ani publicly, whenever she can, to find out the ‘‘truth’’ of her father’s death. The
deaths of both fathers/husbands cause numerous tensions among Ani, Raffi, and Celia.
During one of her lectures on Gorky, Ani is visited by Saroyan, a world-renowned
filmmaker who is directing a film about the Armenian Genocide, based on the journal
of Clarence Ussher, an American missionary resident in Van in 1915.15 Saroyan and
his scriptwriter, Rouben (Eric Bogosian), want to incorporate Gorky as the protagonist
in the film and ask Ani to become their art history consultant. Raffi, too, becomes part
of the film crew.
Saroyan casts the half-Turkish Ali (Elias Koteas) in the role of Jevdet Bey, the
governor of Van and one of the instigators of the genocide there. Ali lives an
uncomfortable existence with his lover, Phillip (Brent Carver), a security guard at the
art gallery where the Gorky painting The Artist and His Mother hangs. Phillip has a
son, Tony (Max Morrow), and a homophobic father, David (Christopher Plummer),
a customs inspector on the eve of retirement.
We see Saroyan’s film predominantly in flashback as Raffi, returning from a trip to
Turkey to film the ruins that form part of his traumatic heritage, is stopped by David
at customs. David suspects that Raffi’s unopened cans of film contain something
more sinister and interrogates him as Raffi attempts to explain the 1915 genocide
committed in the Armenian provinces of Ottoman Turkey, frequently dubbed,
‘‘the forgotten genocide.’’16 Raffi is eventually released from customs and reunited
with his mother, Ani.
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Structures, Documents, and Stories
In many ways, Ararat is an overtly dichotomous film, both understandable and
unfathomable, ethical and uncommitted, self-assured and uncertain. The intricacies of
the film and the convoluted structures entwined in the sequences create serpentine
narratives that weave in and out of periods and locations, making it unclear whether
particular sequences belong to Saroyan’s film or to Ararat. The circuitous network
of plots and themes gives Ararat its postmodern approach, deconstructing the
historiography and transmission of the Armenian Genocide by locating it fluidly
both inside and outside its historical boundaries.
Egoyan deliberately adopts a ruptured narrative to reveal the protagonists’
identities as fragmented, framed by the complications of relationships, past and
present. Ararat ponders the issues associated with people who deny their history (as
does the Turkish-descended Ali) and who are obsessed enough to nurture their history
at the expense of their present (e.g., the young Armenian-descended Raffi). Ani
struggles with her obsession with someone else’s history (the real-life Armenian
painter, and genocide victim, Arshile Gorky) while denying the history of Others.
Moreover, Celia, Ani’s stepdaughter, is independently preoccupied with her own
personal histories at the expense of Others.
Ararat’s complex narrative structure, which serves to illustrate the tensions
between lives and histories, has confounded some critics and left many reviewers
confused about the details of the film.17 Often there are expectations, derived from
classical literary and filmic narratives, that a historical film or one engaging with deep
trauma should offer a linear, chained cause-and-effect relationship. But Egoyan is
suspicious of documents and artifacts that claim certainty, because, for him, there is
no single ‘‘truth’’ that can illuminate the complexity not only of the genocide but also of
the need to understand, comprehend, and express calamitous, denied events.
Integrated into the structure of Saroyan’s film is the issue of artistic license and
the meaning attached to artifacts, as revealed in a sequence on the film set. When Ani
visits the set of Ussher’s house in Van, Saroyan follows her through the living area to
the balcony, telling her that the set and the props faithfully mimic his mother’s
description of life in the Armenian provinces prior to 1915: the replication, for Saroyan,
is an homage to his mother, a victim of the genocide. The camera follows Ani outside to
the balcony, passing the exterior black fac¸ade, indicating a shift in balance and
perspective with respect to authenticity and verisimilitude. Once outside, Ani
questions Saroyan’s decision to include the backdrop painting of Mount Ararat,
because she cannot reconcile empirical truths with artistic license: the mountain
would not be visible from the city of Van. Filmed in hues of murky yellow (the colors
resemble the shade of a faded newspaper), this sequence evokes the physical remnants
of the genocide: achromatic sepia photographs. As emphasized throughout the
film, Saroyan places Mount Ararat on the set of his film because it represents a
particular cultural link to Armenians in diaspora.18 Because the set contradicts Ani’s
depiction of her historical reality, poetic license amounts, for her, to a distortion of
‘‘authenticity.’’
While documentary evidence is crucial to Saroyan’s film (as mentioned above, his
film dramatically documents the memoirs of Clarence Ussher),19 other characters
dismiss artifacts as erroneous. For instance, Raffi replays video documentary evidence
of his trip to the Armenian ancestral land to David, the customs officer; avoiding Raffi’s
gaze, David remarks that there is ‘‘no way of confirming that a single word you’ve
told me tonight is true.’’ As far as David is concerned, the ‘‘documentary evidence’’ is
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worthless, but for Raffi, the same footage contextualizes the genocide, even though
documents often obscure meaning through necessary selectivity. After David’s words,
the film cuts to Raffi, his gaze fixed on the interrogator while Mount Ararat appears on
the video screen of his camcorder. Raffi announces determinedly, ‘‘Everything I’ve told
you tonight is exactly what happened.’’ This sequence demonstrates the difficulty of
art to represent, and artifacts to document—that is, art’s power to capture an essence
of intricate emotional and ethical notions and its failure to be comprehensive and
exhaustive—questioned by both Egoyan and his critics.20
Egoyan, it appears, firmly resists imposing any universal values on the film.21
People are, quite simply, complex. In Ararat, as in our daily lives, motivations are
unexplained, and thus disappointment will befall those restless for formula and
resolution. As one critical reviewer comments, ‘‘questions [of unfinished relationships,
for example] are not resolved or even satisfactorily formulated.’’22 However, to create a
formula whereby all loose ends can be tied together is to ignore the ongoing traumatic
effects of genocide over the generations. Thus, Ararat’s unresolved narratives allow
the legacy of the trauma to continue.
A crucial sequence (discussed below in more detail) helps to explain Ararat’s fluid
narratives. The painter Gorky—filmed in soft light and ethereal tones—erases the
hands of his mother on his famous painting The Artist and His Mother.23 For Celia,
the hands are unfinished, symbolizing the imperative issues in her life, which remain
unresolved. However, Ani’s historical understanding of the genocide is limited
to Gorky’s story—for her, the painting is finished—and thus she is certain the past
is complete, a past that is spoken monotonically. She discontinues negotiations with
her own and others’ histories.
Closure, it seems, is paradigmatic of a ‘‘truth’’ that does not always exist in non-
linear narratives. In his critique of the freedom exerted upon the ontological Being,
Levinas remarks, somewhat acerbically, that a ‘‘miracle of modern Western freedom
unhindered by any memory or remorse . . . [opens] onto a ‘glittering future’ where
everything can be rectified,’’24 commenting on the ability of Being to exercise a freedom
of the self over Others. This invites abandonment or denial of the past by choosing
the primacy of the self over the (traumatic) lives of Others. By commenting on the
incompleteness of histories—especially a genocide that is denied—Egoyan, it seems,
inverts this ontological ‘‘gift’’ of glittering futures. Framed around the narrative of
an allegorical retelling of the genocide, Ararat illuminates the critical notions of
respecting the Other’s trauma and honoring the past.
Crucial to Ararat’s self-conscious narrative is the intertwining of stories told
between the characters. Ararat is a series of vignettes, episodes, and glimpses of
memory that seem to constitute a cycle of stories. Indeed, in many ways, the characters
do not interact; rather, they tell stories to each other, and these stories are crucial to
understanding Ararat as a film about genocide told in a Levinasian ethical framework.
For some of the characters—namely David and Ani—the passage from telling a story
to listening to the Other forms the basis of their journey from self-obsession to facing.
As Colin Davis explains,
the Other makes me realize that I share the world, that it is not my unique possession,
and I do not like this realization. My power and freedom are put into question. Such a
situation is ethical because a lot depends upon how I respond.25
Ararat firmly connects the questioning of the self’s freedom and power to the genocide:
the perpetrators and deniers never accomplish ‘‘this realization,’’ believing others to be
their ‘‘unique possession.’’ The journey from ontological self-obsession (telling stories)
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to upright exposure26 (listening to stories) is elucidated in the narratives passed from
one character to the next in present-day Toronto.
Thematically, stories and their meanings resonate strongly with those who tell and
those who listen. In two separate sequences, Saroyan recounts to David, the customs
agent, and Martin, his lead actor, the significance of the pomegranate; in her lecture
on Gorky, Ani frames the artist’s life around a story; Raffi describes the Armenian
Genocide to David, and Saroyan is producing a story that is the product of Gorky’s life.
All these stories—including that of Saroyan, whose mother ate a pomegranate seed a
day during the deportations of the Armenians—relate to the genocide. The characters
formulate, rather than fabricate, stories in order to make sense of the genocide. Stories
bind cultural and familial areas, connecting us to the Other, if the subject chooses to
respond to the saying (listening) rather than to the said (the signification).27 As Ani
tells Rouben after Celia slashes the Gorky painting, art is ‘‘a sacred code.’’ For Ani,
art is a link to the genocide, a denied event that is outside the saying, located in
speechlessness, symbols, and incognizance.
The significance of a story’s ethical attachment to an interlocutor and a receiver
emerges when Raffi reads an account of the genocide to David. While being
interrogated at customs for drug smuggling, Raffi is obliged to present David with
the footage he shot in Ani, the ancient capital of the Armenian kingdom, now in
Turkey. The moment is terrifying for Raffi: he grapples to find meaning in and
evidence of the genocide, which leaves him in an intensely personal and private
space while exposed to the interrogator, David. Raffi is shot in close-up, revealing
only his face or his hands, a timid being, dominated by the physical authority and
official position of the customs officer. In contrast, David is shot austerely, in medium
close-ups, and his phlegmatic presence contrasts to that of the deferential Raffi. The
camera centers on the grainy, focused footage of Armenian ruins from Raffi’s
camcorder, then pans left, racking focus, to an extreme close-up of Raffi’s face: the
images on the camcorder are now blurred. Confounded, Raffi listens to his own
voiceover: ‘‘When I see these places, I realize how much we’ve lost. Not just the land,
and the lives, but the loss of any way to remember it—there is nothing here to
prove that anything [i.e., the genocide] ever happened.’’ The filmic stylistic
techniques employed, coupled with Raffi’s voiceover, emphasize the erasure and
denial of the genocide, resulting in a ‘‘blurred’’ perspective of the events. With Raffi’s
voiceover lingering, Egoyan then splices in Saroyan’s wide-angled depiction of the
deportation marches of Armenians from their homeland, demonstrating the textured
layers of stories and denied trauma. Amid the perfervid musical score,
now characteristic of Saroyan’s film, the camera remains still as the young Gorky
and his mother walk toward the camera. The sequence then cuts to a low-angle shot
from Gorky’s point of view—the glaring daylight hiding nothing—as he witnesses
from a distance the brutality of the perpetrators toward the deportees. The sequence
cuts to Gorky in his studio around 1934, tinged with mellowing, sorrel tones
and delicate light, while the screams from the previous sequence continue,
suggesting Gorky’s remembrance of these events. As Jonathan Romney observes,
these sequences help visualize the ‘‘transmission of testimony’’ and memory.28 By
entwining these sequences together, the film also raises questions about the
possession of stories.
Indeed, ownership of stories is vital. For example, Celia’s ‘‘story’’ about her father’s
death changes (she is adamant in different sequences that he committed suicide, was
pushed off a cliff, or fell), leaving her with no ownership of this story. Murray Whyte
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argues that because ‘‘Ani was the only one there [when Celia’s father died] . . . the story
belongs to her alone.’’29 However, Ani does not own the story because she was the only
witness; rather, it is hers alone because she is unwilling to accept Celia’s trauma or
expression of pain and thus is reluctant to impart the story. Implicitly, Ararat equates
this defacing of the Other with the denial of the genocide and the means to express the
genocide.
Egoyan uses numerous methods to depict the convoluted motif of stories and
retelling of truths. Jonathan Markovitz contends that ‘‘Egoyan presents decisions
about how to represent history as highly calculated and far from natural or
automatic’’;30 however, it is evident that the director is also deeply concerned with
the dilemma associated with representation. For instance, in contrast to Raffi’s
torment about the legacy of the Armenian people, Saroyan confidently asserts the ease
of representing the genocide. Unlike Ararat, Saroyan’s film is punctuated with
sweeping orchestral music, wide-angled panoramic shots, and sequences that are often
over-lit. However, there is a curious incongruity between Saroyan’s film and the
‘‘story’’ he wishes to tell. As Whyte points out, Saroyan is ‘‘bristling with his own sense
of moral superiority . . . [with the] ownership of the untold history as his to tell.’’31
But he tries to have it both ways: on the one hand, he is adamant that this is his
mother’s story, while on the other hand he proposes to tell the objective ‘‘truth’’ of the
genocide. Nevertheless, as Egoyan admits, ‘‘There are many stories in the film that are
being borne by tellers who are unreliable . . . but that doesn’t diminish the need to
tell it.’’32 Stories infiltrate both Ararat and Saroyan’s film as the genocide is lost
in hermeneutic circles. As soon as a character recounts a story, the ownership of
that story is challenged. The same applies to the characters’ understanding of the
genocide, vindicates and clarifies Ararat’s non-chronological structure, and marries
with the ethical responsibility of listening to stories (that is, formulating ways of
understanding).
Twice in the film, characters accuse loved ones of ‘‘telling stories,’’ reducing the
Other’s alterity (the Other’s Otherness) to a patronizing anecdote. First, Ani wanders
into Raffi’s bedroom as morning light filters through the sequence. When Raffi finally
wakes up, Ani accuses him of storytelling. After Raffi explains that he is in love
with Celia, Ani replies, in Armenian,33 ‘‘That’s a new twist to the story.’’ Hurt, Raffi
pleads, ‘‘Why do you need to call it a story?’’ During their conversations, Egoyan uses a
shot-reverse-shot technique, never allowing either character to infiltrate the other’s
space. Later, again in bed, Raffi accuses Celia of fabrication after she tells him that
her father committed suicide. Surprised, and mimicking the haughtiness of his mother
in the previous accusation, Raffi remarks, ‘‘Oh, that’s new. I thought the story was
my mum pushed him off a cliff.’’ Like Raffi earlier, the wounded Celia wonders
why Raffi is turning a meaningful event in her life into a tale. By reducing these
events in their lives to a ‘‘story,’’ the accuser disparages the Other with the imperialism
of the self, repudiating the storyteller’s Otherness.34 Egoyan says, ‘‘the . . . idea of
the film . . . is that history is not just about telling a story. Someone has to receive it,
someone has to listen, someone has to be curious and investigate.’’35 Thus, a story
is ‘‘just a story’’ unless someone is willing to listen and—ethically speaking—receive.
He continues,
What happens to stories that don’t get told? . . . What happens when people live with
these things? It’s not just a question of the Armenian genocide. Those stories don’t go
away. That’s the central emotional thrust of this film: what happens when things are
left unsaid [and unheard]?36
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The unsaid and the unheard are most evident in sequences that end with Ani
speechless, silenced, with nothing to say. Egoyan lingers on these images of Ani as her
struggle to Be37 affects the exposure of the Other through speech and facing.38
Ararat implicitly asks whether it is ethically legitimate not to question our reasons
for failing to listen to the Other. In other words, Why do people tell stories?
The questioning is not only a psychological exercise but an ethical one, for, as Egoyan
observes,
History is not only the responsibility of the person who speaks the truth. It needs
someone to listen. When that person listens, how they listen, why they listen are
all essential components of the communication of experience.39
Moreover, in order to maintain an ethical rather than a literal ‘‘truth,’’ Ararat
questions reliance on historical artifacts to expose the denied genocide.
The Struggle to be Ethical: Denying the Other, Confronting the Other
Denial of the Armenian Genocide creates persuasive narratives rooted in what
Peter Balakian correctly identifies as ‘‘part of the modern Turkish Republic’s
founding mythology.’’40 This mythology, detailed meticulously by Balakian, reaches
back to massacres of Armenians in the late nineteenth century41 and pivots on the
notion—often used by deniers—that genocide simply parallels mass murder.42 Thus,
quantitative arguments often appear in the denier’s thesis: as Balakian points out,
there are ‘‘continued efforts to minimize the Armenian death toll,’’43 as if a lower
number of deaths could constitute a rigorous argument that genocide did not occur.
The quantitative argument, as David Alonzo-Maizlish confirms, ‘‘associates the
moral magnitude of genocide with a presumption that the crime only exists when
large numbers of people have been killed,’’44 and thus such arguments often overlook
other key elements of the CPPCG. Although mass murder is an important element of
the crime, genocide can be multidimensional, manifesting itself along a graduated
scale with dehumanization of the group at one extreme and torture, biological
absorption, rape, or killings at the other. The reticulate sequences within Ararat
wrestle with notions of genocide beyond mass murder, replete with themes of denial
and self-obsession.
Ararat is explicitly concerned with denial of the genocide and negation of the
Other’s right to be Other. Arsine´e Khanjian comments that the film centers around
two families, ‘‘discovering and coming to terms with the truths and denials in their
own lives . . . just like the Armenians have been trying to do for almost one hundred
years.’’45 Despite this contrast between ‘‘truth’’ and denial, Ararat does not claim to
explain or resolve these issues. However, what is unequivocal—a point touched upon
above in the analysis of stories—is the characters’ (dis)engagement with others in a
non-ethical manner. They deny the Other’s liberty to be Other, as reflected in the
awkward conversations and the silences separating the characters, particularly those
between Ani and the others. Ani remains baffled at the end of some sequences, as if
questioning the foundations of her ontological self-preoccupation. Ani and Raffi, in
particular, evolve from ontological self-obsession to the ‘‘relation with the [O]ther—the
absolutely [O]ther—who has no frontier with the same,’’46 although that evolution is
fraught.
Marrying the contemporary denial of genocide with the denial of the Other’s right
to be Other, Ararat is replete with moments that challenge the characters’ ability to
engage with the alterity of the Other, an other who threatens a self-centered
perspective. Ani, for example, refuses to acknowledge Celia’s inquiry and pain over her
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father’s death. By denying Celia’s perspective, Ani forms her identity around her
‘‘allergic reaction’’47 to the Other.
When Ani rushes onto Saroyan’s set, after Martin’s remarks about her self-
importance and totalizing of the Other, she is struck by the epiphany of the Other: the
self, says Levinas, ‘‘cannot find meaning within its being-in-the-world, with the
ontology of sameness.’’48 As a historian, Ani presupposes that she can, in Leonard
Grob’s words, ‘‘possess the world through knowing it’’;49 Ararat demonstrates,
however, that even people who are mired in their own history and who, as in Ani’s
case, dedicate their life to imagery cannot ‘‘see.’’ By structuring the Gorky narrative as
an extension of her pain and her self, Ani refuses to engage with the Other as Other,
projecting the other as an extension of her Being. Her fixation on Gorky’s traumatic
experience of the genocide and on his mother, who died from starvation in her son’s
arms, means that she is unable to consolidate her relationship with her son.50 When
Ani finally allows herself a space in which, as Levinas puts it, the ‘‘ethical aspect [the
alterity of the Other] dominates the passionate aspect [her work],’’51 the release of the
self-obsession yields rather than sacrifices.
Egoyan himself finds it ‘‘very problematic’’ that somehow ‘‘moral authority . . .
[means] you could silence someone else because you have experienced [pain].’’52
He refers specifically to the sequence in which Saroyan denies Ali, the Turkish actor,
the opportunity to tell his story. This encounter occurs after Ali’s substantial but
caricatural portrayal, in Saroyan’s film, of the notorious 1915 governor of Van, Jevdet
Bey. Still in his Turkish uniform, Ali runs after the famous director, thanking him for
the opportunity to play the part of Jevdet. The medium-close-up shots of Ali reveal the
dismantled film set of Van, paralleling the deniers’ distortion of the siege of the real
city in 1915.53 With his sword by his side, Ali suggests to Saroyan that the Armenian
Genocide could be construed as a war. Saroyan is filmed in medium close-up, and the
background is bleak but clear, as he refuses a dialogue with the actor because Ali’s
view negates his own. Thus, Saroyan rejects alterity. Through the intersection of
sequences, Ararat draws parallels between Saroyan’s refusal of Ali as Other, Ali’s
denial of the genocide, and Ani’s unimpassioned denial of Celia’s pain. When the
characters act and interact, they behave unethically by silencing the Other’s right to
discourse and history. Ani’s denial of Celia results in the slashing of Gorky’s painting:
Celia lacerates what she cannot understand.
Levinas argues that the only way to unburden the suffocating sense of self is to
continue questioning relations with the Other. Ararat attempts to connect the
treatment of the Other in interpersonal relationships with the dangers of behaving in
an ontological framework. Thus, Ararat’s mirroring of the denial of the genocide with
David’s refusal to accept his son’s homosexuality invokes Levinas’ claim that our
ontological world does not give us cause to, ‘‘ethically speaking, be satisfied with it.’’54
Haunted by Others, by Others’ histories, and by the weighty reminder of the existence
of the Armenian Genocide, the characters in Ararat are troubled and disturbed until
the upright exposure releases the struggle to Be.
The Genocides in Ararat
The conventions for representing genocide are juxtaposed between Saroyan’s film-
within-a-film and the narratives in Ararat. In contrast to the dislocated narratives of
Ararat, Saroyan’s film derives from traditional conventions of historicity, documen-
tary, and testimony and leads to an investigation into the medley of perspectives on
genocide presented in Ararat and an analysis of the melding of the films.
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Although Egoyan claims that Ararat is not a literal, historical interpretation of the
genocide, historical reenactments are staged throughout Saroyan’s film: group
deportations; violent murders; naked women made to dance, then doused with
kerosene and lit with a torch; and horrific rape, which in one sequence refers
poignantly back to the mother–child image of Gorky and his mother. A woman lies on a
wagon; the camera follows her arm to her hand, clasping the fingers of her child,
hidden under the cart, as a Turk violently rapes her. These images of Christian
Armenians intended for destruction (dehumanization, laceration, biological ‘‘purifi-
cation,’’ and possession) are clearly recognizable as genocide, as expressed in the
CPPCG. In itself, Saroyan’s film portrays the genocide effectively, but it does little to
explore the impact of the trauma and the difficulties caused by denial.
Of course, the use of a film-within-a-film has specific advantages for Egoyan.
He can unveil and ‘‘document’’ the genocide without claiming the film to be his (which,
in the end, it is). More specifically, he uses this device to establish how the pain of the
genocide affects future generations. Ayda Erbal maintains that Ararat ‘‘argues for a
more complex but nuanced approach’’55 than Saroyan’s film, a film Egoyan claims is
not the film he would want to make. In an interview, he explains why:
I wrote this script of the movie-within-the-movie and then kind of filed it away, because
I couldn’t imagine making it, but felt a responsibility to make it . . . Then a few years ago
our young son was asking about the genocide, and he asked the obvious question that a
kid would ask . . . ‘‘Did the Turks say they were sorry?’’ I realized that if I told him no,
the whole trauma would be transmitted to him . . . I want to talk about this moment that
I’m having with my son right now, and I went back to the script.56
Erbal argues that Egoyan’s use of the film-within-the-film sheds light on the
‘‘entertainment industry’s abilities (or rather disabilities) of narrating that which is
not narratable.’’57 How a narrative narrates the unnarratable is unexplored in Erbal’s
review, quite possibly because of its logical conundrum, but the gist of her argument is
important. Saroyan’s film occupies a brief space in Egoyan’s film not because the film-
within-the-film is unnarratable (this would imply that it cannot be represented) but,
rather, because Saroyan’s film does not explore either the ramifications of the genocide
or the dehumanizing effects on the Other present in the gradations of genocide
and the denial that underpins the aftermath of the genocide. While Egoyan creates
a philosophical inquiry, Saroyan produces a document. Saroyan’s film is, in short, a
depiction of the residue of his mother’s traumatic memories and experiences. It is also
an attempt to document the genocide.
Saroyan’s documentation and its ‘‘unexplored ramifications of the genocide’’ in no
way justify a refutation of the genocide. Indeed, in representing his mother’s
experience of the genocide Saroyan has no intention of creating a falsehood. Neither
does his film suggest that the forced marches, killings, and rapes it portrays are
fabricated. However, Ararat evidently raises issues about the difficulties of represent-
ing collective trauma and personal pain as objective fact.
By employing the film-within-the-film, Egoyan distances himself from the creation
of a constructed history that, in the end, would be a deceitful narrative precisely
because it would profess, rather arrogantly, to narrate an entire chronicle: a
representation of memory. If, as one commentator has argued, through Saroyan’s
film ‘‘we are catching glimpses of the film [that is, Ararat] that this is supposed to
be,’’58 then an essential point may be overlooked. Creating a historically accurate
document is in some ways a fraudulent endeavor, because such a document professes
to be axiomatic. It is only through expressions of the ethical that the characters in
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Ararat understand emotionally, if not comprehend epistemologically, the fallout from
genocide over generations.
Thus, in some ways, Saroyan’s film is there not to enhance historical knowledge
but, rather, to subvert and challenge insights into the genocide by revealing its
consequences. Ararat’s deconstruction of the images of killings and rapes in Saroyan’s
film59 is evident at two critical points in the film. First, when Ani bursts onto Saroyan’s
film set—after Celia slashes Gorky’s painting The Artist and His Mother—to inform
Saroyan of her resignation as art history consultant, she disregards the production
assistant’s warning and interrupts a crucial shoot. The actor in Saroyan’s film—
Martin Harcourt, as Ussher—is appalled. The characters are almost silent, as if the
trauma of the genocide has inflicted aphonia. The set lighting is subdued and delicate
as Ussher attends a wounded child surrounded by destitute people. Coming out of
character, Martin, outraged at Ani’s self-importance, calls her to account, and, as he
does so, the actors around him stay in character and can occasionally be heard
weeping. The camera slowly zooms in during his monologue to Ani, which is worth
quoting in full:
What is this god-damn-it? We’re surrounded by Turks. We’ve run out of supplies. Most
of us will die. The crowd needs a miracle. This child is bleeding to death. If I can save his
life it may give us the spirit to continue. This is his brother. His pregnant sister was
raped in front of his eyes before her stomach was slashed open to stab her unborn child.
His father’s eyes were gouged out of his head and stuffed into his mouth. His mother’s
breasts were ripped off. She bled to death. Who the fuck are you?
This is one of the most commanding sequences in the film, as it questions Ani and
her totalizing of the self and her sanctimonious regard for the painting but not the
film. It is also a unique way of representing the genocide, because it denotes the
disintegration of the Other through the denial of the Other’s alterity, the very nucleus
of the intention to destroy a group.
Second, Martin’s outburst is linked with the sequence in which the scriptwriter,
Rouben, implores Martin to read Ussher’s book, as everything he needs to play the part
is contained in that text. Martin scoffs at this proposal—he has read the book, has
read every known document, and even the Bible, yet he understands that, in the
end, the compassionate response to the character Ussher will have to come from him
alone. Thus, Martin’s telling Ani how the experience affects him is more revealing of
the horrors of genocide than the film’s reproduction of the genocide through
conventional images. Martin knows the history, but this does not automatically
connect him to the genocide; it is only through his art—his acting—that he is in a
position to understand it. Knowledge is important, but responding to the Other’s pain
and poverty60 is fundamental, and as Martin exposes his ‘‘story’’ to Ani, the account of
the genocide and its dehumanizing effect on the Other becomes disturbingly concrete.
Indeed, in Ararat, denial of the Other’s right to be Other is closely connected to the
genocide. As Bedros Afeyan points out, the affiliation between the present-day
characters and the Armenian genocide is central, not contrary, to the film and its
purpose:
The central issue becomes the inability of some people to let others be. It was
intolerance of a different people after all that fuelled the Turkish desire to exterminate
the Armenians. Tolerance, love, and fraternity, whether between family members or
citizens, are the building blocks of harmony.61
Thus, Ararat explicitly toys with issues of hypocrisy and denial depicted in the
genocide and in interpersonal relationships. Purposeful disregard forms an element of
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dehumanization; in Ararat the genocide and present-day events are inextricably
linked, because a core issue in the film is the essence of genocide: the corrosion and
erosion of Others.
One commentator accuses Egoyan of an apparently shallow mirroring of David’s
denial of his son’s homosexual relationship with current and past Turkish denial of the
genocide.62 Seen from an ethical perspective, however, this mirroring highlights the
importance of considering the Other as Other and not as an extension of the self.
Indeed, Levinas equates how we behave in war (or genocide) with the totalizing of the
self:
The visage of [B]eing that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality which
dominates Western philosophy. Individuals are reduced to being bearers of forces that
command them unbeknown to themselves. The meaning of individuals . . . is derived
from the totality.63
The totality of the self and the totality of Being obfuscate the upright exposure of the
Other, such that the other dominates a nebulous Other.
A deconstructed narrative may be confusing, but a constructed narrative seems to
distance the spectator from intricate nuances of the formations and foundations of pain
and the effects of genocide. Even though, as Taner Akc¸am argues, ‘‘the film explores
the role of that history in selective memory and identity today,’’64 it deconstructs
that memory as fragmented and often personal. Robert Solomon articulates well the
German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer’s understanding of the effect of history on
our interpersonal relationships:
the unifying theme that will allow us to understand one another, and move beyond the
Babel of competing voices is not in the realm of theory but rather of practice. We share a
historical situation, a world, and by comparing and contrasting our various
interpretations, in this historical context, we can achieve a ‘‘fusion of horizons’’ despite
our differences.65
Unable to escape the terrible history of their ancestors, the characters in Ararat
engage—often unknowingly—in a ‘‘fusion of horizons’’ with Others who share that
history.
The staging of the film in the present indicates that genocide is not something that
happened only in the past, in another country, far away, to other people, because
treatment of the Other is at the core of genocide and of daily relationships. Ararat
presents genocide not only in terms of the acts described in article 2 of the CPPCG but
also as an aftermath. This is at least one way to make the genocide relevant today,
regardless of who we are or where we are. For example, after Ani’s outburst on the
set of Saroyan’s film, we return to David’s interrogation of Raffi. The images of
the remnants of Armenia on the camcorder are clear as Raffi reads a passage from the
script of Saroyan’s film. Ararat cuts to Saroyan’s film as a German witness66 reveals to
Martin the horrors she has seen, describing the burning alive of Armenian women by
the Turks, who command the naked women to ‘‘dance’’ before they are doused with
kerosene and murdered. The sequence shifts from Raffi’s voiceover and a high-angled
shot of the horror from the German woman’s point of view to Saroyan and Raffi’s
reaction to the take. The narrative finally settles on the young Gorky, shielded behind
a rock and witnessing the brutal and unmerciful scene, the shot lit with the flames
from the charring bodies. ‘‘How,’’ the German woman asks, ‘‘shall I dig out these eyes
of mine?’’67 Not only do her eyes witness the horror of the genocide, she also carries the
responsibility of relaying the sight before her, thus extending the trauma, a fear
earlier expressed by Egoyan with respect to his son. Through the blurring of present
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and past, perspectives and stories, places and interpretations, Ararat locates
the omnipresence of the genocide both in and out of its historicity. The killings
of the Armenians in 1915, presented in Saroyan’s film as reenactments, come across in
Ararat as cerebral images and moments. Egoyan announces,
Maybe the closest we come to the sense of the desecration of genocide is not [in] the epic
scenes in the film-within-a-film, but in the moment when Gorky erases his mother’s
hands. That, to me, is the purest expression of what those feelings would be.68
In a most poignant moment in the film, briefly mentioned earlier, Gorky dances to
Armenian music in his studio in New York, clapping paintbrushes against his paint
palette in time to the melody. Later, the sequence returns, with the relentless sound of
the needle scratching the gramophone record’s groove, as Gorky kneels by the painting
and covers his hands in white paint, gently touching his mother’s painted hands.
Finally, with trembling fingers, Gorky erases his mother’s hands, as if committing
a heinous crime. He can barely look up into his mother’s eyes—as if he fears her
very Otherness. It is the very interconnection of apparently unrelated sequences that
connects profoundly to the genocide.
The combination of elements in Saroyan’s film and in Ararat produce the
exploration of genocide as gradations, percolating in the Turkish and Armenian
nations through the generations. Rather than attempting to present the past
evidentially, Ararat explores questions of historicity, truth making, thoughts of
denial (and, in particular, the Turkish government’s denial), prejudice, discrimination,
ethics, and injustice in our present lives. The film ultimately finds all pain to be of
equivalent value. This is evident not in any one particular sequence but in the very
structure of the film, that is, the mise-en-sce`ne and the semblance of a sequence to
connect and refer to another sequence of seemingly unrelated events.69 For instance,
after Raffi listens to his own voiceover on the camcorder while being interrogated by
David as he watches images of Turkey, the sequence seamlessly cuts to Saroyan’s film,
where hundreds of people are slowly walking across the same land filmed by Raffi.
Gorky and his mother are two of the many broken people kicked and beaten by
the Turks mounted on horseback. This sequence fades to 1935, as Gorky sits by the
window of his New York studio remembering these very events. Through the
interweaving of time, space, and place, Ararat explores the present-day denial of
intentional destruction through metaphors of contradiction and explorations of the
Armenian Genocide (and its attested occurrence) and filmic metonymy. Subtly, yet
convincingly, the intent to destroy and to continue to destroy (and deny) manifests
itself in Egoyan’s art and in his use of the film-within-the-film.
Mimicking the processes of genocide, as expressed in article 2(a) of the CPPCG,
Ararat explores both the killing of members of the group (via Saroyan’s film) and,
through its intricate narrative structure, the resulting fallout and disintegrating
effects on the victims and their families over generations. Both Ararat and Saroyan’s
film force the viewer to confront the immediacy of the genocide, and, despite its
historical distance, the ethical obligation to recreate, represent, listen, and see cannot
be ignored. The interception of sequences that link and bind the present and past gives
Egoyan the means to create a deliberately ethical film.
The aesthetic power of art, representation, and the idea of creativity to heal
(or, indeed, to express notions of healing) is at the center of this reflective piece of work.
The capacity of art and its ability to engage the artist in ‘‘working through’’ trauma are
represented in the film not only through the character of Gorky but also through the
filmmakers themselves, whether Saroyan or Egoyan.
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Conclusion
In Ararat, Egoyan attempts to present genocide as more than mass murder by
challenging its understanding through the fragmentation of narratives, stories, and
denial. Ararat presents many truths about the genocide while maintaining a grip on
the dangers of revisionism by asking what the consequences are for subsequent
generations when a traumatic and circumstantiated history is denied and silenced.
As Roger W. Smith argues,
Denial, unchecked, turns politically imposed death into a ‘‘non-event’’: in place of words
of recognition, indignation and compassion, there is, with time, only silence.70
As the Other is defaced in the genocide, Ararat attempts to reveal that the genocide
is devalued and decontextualized. In their denial of the genocide, as indicated
by Saroyan’s statement quoted at the beginning of this article, the repudiators deface
yet again. Moreover, by creating a fragmented narrative, Egoyan implicitly remarks
on the disintegration of the memory of the genocide and the fractured historical
location of Armenian provinces, historic sites that expanded, diminished, and
disappeared prior to and during the rule of the Ottoman Empire. As Romney explains,
Armenia ‘‘is at once a real place and a complex abstraction.’’71
Ararat’s open-ended narrative structure marries well with the unlimited
paradigms of the Armenian Genocide. Through the endless stories that the characters
reiterate and believe, the viewer fathoms the gravity of acknowledging the historical
connection to a traumatic background. Leaving traumas unrepresented opens the
possibility of denial; when the Other is unheard it becomes, in the Levinasian sense,
unethical.
Struggles with one’s histories are integral to the defacing of the Other, while
denial, a topic infiltrating the remembering of the Armenian Genocide today, lies at
the heart of Ararat. Attempted refutation of the Armenian Genocide by the present-
day Turkish government—and by key political figures in the United States72—allows
Egoyan to create a film overflowing with perspectives (memories/stories obfuscated
through tangible pain and intangible recognition) of genocide. The devaluing of an
Other results in the denial not only of crimes against groups of people but of the
individual’s right to be Other.
Ararat takes us beyond a common understanding of genocide as mass murder
by questioning the ethical nature of the past and the present in the appearance of the
Other in front of us. Principally, Egoyan offers a complex narrative, presenting
the denial of genocide as mirroring the struggle to remain ethical. The characters are
disturbed and disturbing, trapped in a state of either anguish or denial. Levinas
effectively describes this disturbing state:
I have described ethical responsibility as insomnia or wakefulness precisely because it
is a perpetual duty of vigilance and effort which can never slumber. Ontology as a state
of affairs can afford to sleep.73
Ararat is astonishingly restless, in a ‘‘perpetual [state] of [ethical] duty,’’ as the
protagonists are invariably lulled out of their slumber of Being. This film gradually
depicts the significance of love and community, cultural and familial values, and
the devastation of the effects of the loss, in Raffi’s words, of ‘‘any way to remember’’
the genocide. The sequences depicting Gorky and his mother, their closeness and
enduring love, which find Gorky in New York painting a portrait of his mother and
himself based on a photograph taken prior to the genocide, is juxtaposed to the close
but testing relationship between Ani and Raffi.
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By contrast, Saroyan’s film, while documenting undoubtedly crucial events, fails to
confront the trauma of denial for future generations and thus neglects the imperative
of fathoming the genocide after the event. While the memory of the genocide in
Saroyan’s film is fixed, Ararat attempts to challenge this fixation by exploring the
fluidity and selectivity of memory. Although Egoyan intersects narratives that overlap
in time and location, the sequences are linked through the themes of denial and
disrespect. Ultimately, Ararat asks what it means to deny the alterity of the Other:
indeed, why it is ethically illegitimate to exclude and denigrate the Other. Clearly,
Ararat demonstrates that genocide is a matter of graduated effects, not a quibble over
numbers. Recalling the mass murders is vital, but reiterating that the killings
occurred because of dehumanization, because of a choice to ignore the upright
exposure of the Other, is pivotal, as this reflects how one responds to the Other today,
and, indeed, how one deals with the repercussions of a denied genocide.
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